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Abstract 
This paper links two research areas that have developed indepen­
dently -- incentives compatibility for public goods and elicitation of 
subjective probabilities. An analogy between incentives for reporting 
information in the two areas leads to the discovery of a new 
mechanism, based on the Groves mechanism, for eliciting subjective 
probabilities. In the public goods area, the analogy provides an 
extention of the basic theorem of truthful response to the more 
general case when one;s true valuation of the public good is state 
dependent. In the risk assessment area, the analogy provides a gener­
alization of the traditional reporting mechanisms, proper scoring 
rules, and in doing so establishes a representation theorem for them. 
The paper considers three goals which a principal might have 
while choosing a transfer mechanism. These goals are: information 
pooling, strong research incentives for the agents, and identifi­
ability of the agent with the best information. For two structures of 
information and the specific cases considered, the new mechanism 
performs well, compared with four traditional mechanisms, in achieving 
these goals. 
A Groves-like Mechanism in Risk Assessment 
* 
Talbot Page 
The purpose of this paper is to apply ideas from the theory of 
incentive compatibility for revealing willingnesses to pay for a public 
good to the theory of revealing probabilities in risk assessment. The 
link is achieved by an analogy between two models, one for public goods 
and the other for risk assessment. The analogy leads to the discovery 
of a new mechanism, based on the Groves mechanism., for eliciting 
subjective probabilities; a generalization of the basic theorem on the 
Groves mechanism; and generalization of proper scoring rules. Analysis 
of a few specific cases suggests that the new mechanism performs well, 
compared with existing mechanisms. 
In risk assessment we are interested in developing estimates of 
the probability of some event, which might be rare (a reactor core 
meltdown) or unique (chemical X is a carcinogen). There is a principal 
who makes use of these estimates for some decision. We assume the 
principal has no direct information of his own on the probability of 
the event, but relies on the probability estimates provided by agents 
or assessors. The assessors have information on the state of nature 
and form inferences on the probability of the event. The assessors may 
have differing amounts and qualities of information, or they may have 
the same information but interpret if differently. 
The principal may have several goals in mind: elicitation of a 
consensus estimate based on the pooled information; provision for strong 
research incentives, or identification of the assessor with the best 
information of inference skills �he principal may want to hire one of 
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two or more assessors.) As a means toward some mix of these goals, the 
principal agrees to reward the assessors by a transfer mechanism, which 
is a function of the revealed probability estimates and whether or not 
the predicted event occurs in the appropriate time interval. It is 
assumed that the assessors have a single goal; to do ''as best they can" 
in response to a given transfer mechanism. Ihe emphasis of the paper 
will be on this latter question � how the assessors might respond to 
or manipulate various possible transfer mechanisms. A rationale for 
the focus is that no matter what mix of goals the principal might have, 
he will be unable to pick a transfer mechanism until he knows something 
of how the agents might respond to it. In a limited way we will also 
explore bow well various mechanisms perform in meeting possible goals 
of the principal. 
Concern with incentive compatibility in eliciting probability 
judgments bas a venerable history. Thomas Bayes identified the method 
of revealing personal probabilities by means of choices of bets with 
differing monetary odds, and Ramsay, de Finetti, and Savage greatly 
developed this idea. In 1950 Brier [1950] proposed a method of 
eliciting probabilistic weather forecasts and a verification system 
which would be immune to manipulation, or as be put it, 11playing the 
system." Savage (1971) devoted his last paper to mechanisms for 
eliciting truthful revelation of an individual's judgmental probability 
(such mechanisms came to be known as proper scoring rules). Recently 
Grether (1981) has developed a procedure, not depending on risk neutrality, 
for truthful revelation of probability estimates. 
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Interestingly, theorists in the two fields �demand revelation 
for public goods and elicitation of subjective probabilities � trace 
their work to a common source. Savage (1971) based his 
characterization of proper scoring rules on Marschak's seller's price 
auction. Similarly, Green and Laffont (1979, page 36), found 
Marschak' s seller's price auction to contain the 11essence11 of the 
Groves mechanism for public goods. But Green and Laffont do not refer 
to the problem of public goods demand revelation, and even the 
references to Marschak are different. By and large it appears that the 
theories of the two types of revelation have grown up separately, with 
separate terminologies. 
Section I sets out the risk assessment model and defines the 
new elicitation mechanism analogous with the Groves mechanism. Section 
II derives the Bayesian strategy for this mechanism. Section III 
carries the analogy back to Groves mechanism in the public goods model 
and derives the Bayesian strategy for agents who do not know their 
valuations with certainty. With the new elicitation mechanism in hand, 
Section IV turns to the traditional mechanisms for probability 
elicitation, proper scoring rule� and draws the link between the 
Groves-like mechanism and the traditional mechanisms. Section V 
relaxes the assumption of risk neutrality. 
Sections II, IV and V emphasize the agents' problem, to react 
as best they can to a given reward rule. In Sections VI, VII and VIII 
the emphasis shifts toward the principal's problem and his concerns in 
choosing a reward rule. These sections briefly examine the performance 
of various mechanisms in meeting possible goals of the principal: 
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information pooling (Section VI); strong research incentives relative 
to the principal's expected budget (Section VII); and identification of 
the best assessor (Section VIII). 
I. The Model 
The model is basically in the form of a Bayesian game as 
defined by Myerson [forthcoming]1 and first developed by Rarsanyi 
[1967- 8]. The main difference is we focus on the assessors' beliefs 
about the others' actions rather than about the others' information 
sets. 
We begin with an event X and a set of risk assessors 
N={l1 • • •  ,n}. If the event X occurs we write X•l, if not X=O. Each 
assessor has information upon which he forms his judgment of the 
probability of X=l. Each assessor i reports ri' his revealed 
probability of X=l. The ri are reported before X is observed, and 
unless otherwise stated assessor i reports ri without observing the 
other assessors' reports. After X is observed each assessor is 
rewarded on the basis of his and the others' reports and whether X=l 
or X=O. For example, each of n weather forecasters makes a 
probabilistic prediction of rain tomorrow. Various principals use this 
assessment to decide whether or not to harvest a crop today. The 
following day the forecasters are rewarded on the basis of the revealed 
predictions (r1, ••• ,rn) and on whether or not it rained. For a second 
example, each of n toxicologists assess the probability that a chemical 
will score positive in a bioassay. If the assessed probabilities are 
high, the chemical will be restricted from the market during the 
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testing program (testing may take several months, even up to four 
years). If the assessments are low, the chemical will not be 
restricted during testing. Once the test is completed, the assessors 
are rewarded on the basis of the reported Cr1.,,,rn) and on the outcome 
of the test. 
The reward rule is a function t•Ct1, ••• ,tn) where 
ti=ti(r1, •.• ,rn,X) is the reward or transfer to assessor i. The 
strategy space for each i is [011]. 
Write p= f,.(X = 1). With his limited and costly information, 
i may not know p precisely. He expresses his uncertainty by forming 
fi(p), his subjective (generalized) p.d.f. on p. In doing so, he 
forms his expectation of X which is the same as his expectation of p 
(Ei(X)•�(lp+O(l-p))fi(p)dp•�pfi(p)dp•Ei(p)). ll'e will write this 
expectation as p.=E.(p). An assessor's expectation of p, and more 
1 1 
generally his strategic response to a reward rule, depend upon the 
general structure of information as well as his specific, private 
information. 
Assessor i's information may be focused on the probability of X 
or on X itself, as we can see in the following two examples. 
Information Structure ,a. (Assessor i's private 
information on p). Each assessor i knows that event X is a 
trial from a Bernoulli process with unknown parameter p which 
is drawn from a uniform distribution over [O,l]. He knows that 
once p is drawn (but not observed by any of the assessors) he 
will observe Mi independent trials from the same process. Re 
knows that j will observe another Mj independent trials from 
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the same process. This knowledge of the general structure is 
common knowledge for the n assessors. (i knows that j knows 
this structure, i knows that j knows that i knows, etc.) In 
addition, each i has some private information. Each i observes 
yi, the number of successes in bis Mi trials. Assessor i does 
not know y.. Before acquiring bis private information i forms J 
a diffuse prior on p over [0,1] • .After acquiring his private 
information i forms his subjective p.d.f. fi(p), which is a 
beta distribution with parameters l+y. and l+M.- y . • i i i 
Information Structure X (Assessor i's information is on the event 
itself). Each assessor knows that X is a Bernoulli trial with 
. . * probab1li.ty p. 
* 
Each assessor knows p. If X=l i observes Mi 
trials from a Bernoulli process with parameter a� if X •O i 
observes Mi trials from a Bernoulli process with parameter 1- a 
(where a>.5). Thus much information is held in common 
knowledge with the other assessors. Assessor i;s private 
knowledge is Yi, the number of successes in the Mi trials (he 
does not know which process he observes). 
In the first structure Pi is the mean of a beta distribution 
with parameters l+yi and l+Mi- yi; thus PfEi(p)=(l+yi)/(2+Mi). (Ei(p) 
depends upon yi but we suppress this argument.) 
In the second structure pi is obtained by Bayes theorem. 
* * * pi• Pr(X•llyi) = Pr(yi!X=l)p/�r(yiiX=l)p + Pr(yiiX=O)(l- p)) 
M-2y. * * = l/[l+DA 'J where D • (1-p)/p and A •  a/(1- a). 
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As an additional part of the assessors; common knowledge we 
will assume that each i knows the reward rule chosen by the principal. 
In contrast, the principal is in the dark � he must choose the reward 
rule and make use of the reported ri;s without knowing either the 
general structure of information nor the specific private information 
held by the individual assessors. The usual domain of transfer 
mechanisms considered by theorists and recommended for the principal to 
choose from is the set of proper scoring rules. We will define and 
discuss such rules later, but first we explore the properties of the 
new mechanism, based on an analogy with the Groves mechanism for public 
goods. 
The idea is as follows. Each i reports a probability ri of the 
event without knowing the others; reported assessments. For each 
assessor i, the consensus of the other n-1 assessors is defined and 
specified qi. (The consensus of others can be defined in many ways. 
It might be the average of the others' reports, the median of their 
reports, or the geometric mean of the reported odds.) Then if the event 
occurs, i wins if ri.�:.qi (his reported probability is higher than 
the others' consensus) and i loses if ri < qi. And if the event does 
not occur, i wins if ri<qi and i loses if ri2:.qi. How much he wins 
in each case is determined by the others' consensus. The amount of 
a win and the resolution of ties is provided by the definition: 
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Definition: The Groves-like risk assessment mechanism 
(mechanism G for short) is the function t •(t1�---,tn) where 
r-, 
if x = l and pi.::. qi 
ti = qi l. if x = 0 and pi < qi 
0 otherwise 
The consensus of others qi is the pivot of the mechanism for i, 
and as in the Groves mechanism the reward rule is split into two parts. 
the decision of who wins is determined by all the reports, and X; the 
decision of how much i gets if he wins is determined by all the reports 
but i's. Each i knows the aggregation rule defining the consensus, but 
since he does not know the others' reports in advance, he does not know 
the consensus at the time he makes his report. 
Although i does not know the others' private information nor 
their reports, on the basis of his information he forms a belief as to 
their reports and hence as to qi. We write i's p.d.f. on qi as gi(qi). 
Turning the matter around, if i learned the consensus of others he 
might infer something about their information and revise his 
expectation of p. Thus his beliefs about p and qi may not be 
independent and i describes his joint beliefs on p and qi by the 
joint p.d.f. hi(p,qi). We will write i's expectation of p, 
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conditional on qi as 
pi(qi) = Ei(p iqi). 
It turns out that even though i does not observe q., the function P.C·) 1 1 
plays a central role in the Groves-like mechanism. 
II. Bayesian Strategy for the New Mechanism. 
We define i's Bayesian strategy as his expected utility 
maximizing strategy. As background assumptions in this and the next 
few sections we will assume i is risk neutral and has a fixed amount of 
information (for now we don't consider research incentives). These 
assumptions mean that for now i's Bayesian strategy is his reporting 
strategy which maximizes his expected transfer. When i believes that 
there is at least some chance, however small, that qi could be anywhere 
on the unit interval, and when i's conditional expectation P-(q. ) is a 
1 1 
continuous function of qi' the main result is simply stated. 
Theorem 1. If Pi(qi) is continuous and �(qi)>O for 0.S,qi.:$.1, 
then i's Bayesian strategy under mechanism G is a fixed point of pi("). 
Proof. Assessor i's expected transfer, for a given true p and 
q and as a function of his report r (and omitting the subscript i) is 
E(tlp,q,r) 
{ (l -
p(l - p) if r < q 
q)p if r�q 
Taking the expectation over p and q, i's expected transfer as a 
function of r is 
(1) 
(2) 
1 0  
1 l 
T(r) = f I E(t[p,q,r)h(p,q)dµ(p)dµ(q) 
0 0 
• / dµ(p) f (1-q)ph(p,q)dµ(q) + J dµ(p) f q(l-p)h(p,q)dµ(q) 
0 0 0 r+ 
r 1 1 1 
= 1 dµ(q) f (1-q)php[q(p[q)g(q)dµ(p) + J dµ(q) f q(l-p)hp[q(p[q)g(q)dµ(p) 
o o r+ O 
r 
= � (1-q)p(q)g(q)dµ(q) 1 + 1 q(l-p(q))g(q)dµ(q) 
r+ 
f 1 1 = p(q)g(q)dµ(q) + f qg(q)dµ(q) + f qp(q)g(q)dµ(q) O r+ O 
So, except on mass points of g(q), 
T' (r) = \p(r) - r)g(r) 
and since g(r)>O for all O�r.::_l, the maximum of T(r) occurs at the fixed 
point p(r)=r or at 0 or 1. If the maximum occurs at O, we must have 
T'(r)..s_O in a neighborhood (to the right) of O. In this neighborhood 
PC0)-0.::_0. Since p(·) is an expectation of a probability, p(·)�O, so 
p(O)=O, a fixed point. If the maximum occurs at 1, we must have T'(r)_::O, 
for a neighborhood of 1 (to the left), in which case PCl)-1_::0. But p(·).::_1, 
so PCl)=l, a fixed point. 
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In figure 1, i;s conditional expectation of p is drawn as 
increasing in q (i would revise his expectation of p upward upon 
learning that the consensus of others was larger) but not as fast as q • 
While these appear to be plausible conditions neither are required by 
the theorem. (The second condition (p.'(q.)<l) insures that there is i i 
no more than one fixed point, and thus the Bayesian strategy is unique, 
since clearly there is a fixed point, Pie·) being a continuous mapping 
from the unit interval into itself.) The difference between T(r2) and 
T(r1) is the little slice A weighted by g(r1) (and if there is a mass 
point in [r1,r2l the weight is augmented). Clearly as long as pc·) is 
above the diagonal for r in [r1,r2], T(r2)>T(r1). 
Assessor i's Bayesian strategy can be characterized as his 
truthful, regret avoiding strategy (a similar regret avoiding strategy 
turns up in Milgrom [1981]). Consider what could happen if i could 
learn qi after reporting ri but before observing X. If he reported r1 
and then observed q1 he would experience regret in the following sense. 
Upon learning q1, i would revise his expectation of p to v1Cq1). But 
in Figure 1 r1 < q1 so his expected transfer is 
(q1)�-Pi(q1))=q1-q{i)i(q1). But in the figure pi(q1
)>q1, so i would 
experience regret. He could have done better by reporting some r>q1, 
in which case his expected transfer would be (l-q1)Pi(q1)�pi(q1)-q2Pi(q1), 
which is larger than his expected transfer obtained by reporting ri. 
However, if i reported r0 he would not be subject to later regret. If he 
reported r=r0 and q. turned out to be less than r0, then p.(q.)>q., and i is 1 ]. ]. ]. 
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Figure 1 
Bayesian Strategy for Mechanism G 
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better off by a report greater than qi' which he has done. If qi turns 
out to be greater than r0, then p.(q.)<q., and i is better off by a i i i 
report less than qi, which he has done. Thus i;s Bayesian strategy is 
to report that conditional expectation which would lead to no revision 
in strategy if information on qi later became available. Theorem 1 
says that this fixed point strategy is i;s expected transfer maximizing 
strategy when he must choose ri before observing qi. Note that i's 
Bayesian strategy is a dominant strategy. He can do no better than 
report the fixed point of p.(•)no matter what probability weight he i 
puts on others� actions. 
To illustrate the theorem., and for later use, we derive Bayesian 
strategies for simple cases. For Information Structure p, consider the case 
where there are two assessors with symmetric information (M1=M2=M); the 
consensus of others is defined by q1=r2 and q2=r1; strategies are symmetric 
(S1(·)=S2(·)=S(·), where Si(yi)=ri is i's strategy function); and S(·) is 
invertible. Then assessor l's conditional expectation is 
- -1 P1(r2) • (1 + yl + S (r2))/(2 + 2M) 
Although the theorem is stated for g(")>O, we can use it to find a 
candidate equilibrium pair and then check to see if this is a Bayesian 
equilibrium. At the fixed point p1(r1)=r1=(l+y1+s
-1Cr1))/(2+2M) = 
(1+2y1)/(2+2M). So we have the candidate strategy pair 
Cs1,s2) =((l+:ly1)/(2+2M),(1+2y2)/(2+2M)). But if i believes tW.t 
s2Cy2)•(1+2y2)/(2+2M), i maximizes his expected transfer by adopting 
s1(y1)=(1+2y1)/(2+2M) as his strategy function. Thus (S1,s2) is a 
Bayesian equilibrium. (At this equilibrium i believes that g(") is 
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concentrated on M mass points.) 
For Information Structure X, consider the case where M1=Hi•M; 
q1=r2 and q2=r1; and the strategies are symmetric and invertible. 
Then, recalling the previous notation of this information structure, 
- 2M-2 
-l 
Pi (rzl•l/[l+DA 
yl- 25 (r ) 2 J 
At the fixed point Pz<r1 l•ri•l/ [l+
nA 2M-2Y 1-25
-l (r 1) 
J 
2M- 4y 
and 5(y1)=r1=1/[l+DA 
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III. Bayesian Strategy in the Groves Mechanism 
Theorem l was derived after positing a mechanism for eliciting 
probabilities analogues with the Groves mechanism. In this section, 
with the idea the theorem in hand, we run the analogy the other way, 
and derive analogous theorem for the Groves mechanism in the public 
goods model. (We follow the discussion and as much as possible the 
notation of the treatment in Green and Laffont [1979].) To obtain the 
analogy we generalize the model by relaxing one of its usual 
assumptions. In the basic theorem which shows the Groves mechanism to 
have truthful dominant strategies (Green and Laffont Theorem 3.1) it is 
assumed that each i knows vi, his true valuation of the public good, 
with certainty. However, suppose the public good in question is a dam 
which may or may not be built and i's valuation depends upon the 
unknown future state, which describes among other things whether there 
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will be much or little rain in the next ten years. For our 
generalization we will not assume that i knows vi with certainty. 
Instead we will assume that i forms a subjective on the unknown future 
state. This induces a p.d.f. on v1 and the sum of others' reported 
willingnesses to pay. To facilitate the analogy we will write the sum 
of the others' willingness to pay as q., i's joint p.d.f. on (v.,q.) 
1 1 1 
as h1(v1,q1), and his marginal p.d.f. on v1 as £1Cv1). 
Analogously with the risk assessment model, define 
vi + f vfi (v)dµ (v) i's expected valuation of the public good (in 
the absence of knowledge of the others' willingness to pay) and 
define vi (qi) f vh I (viq.)dv, v qi 1 i's valuation of K, conditional 
on the knowledge of the sum of others' willingness to pay. The transfer 
to i in Groves mechanism is 
{ qi + Hi if t. = 
1 
. Hi if 
qi + wi ;:. 0 
q. + ...... <O i 1 
where wi is i's reported willingness to pay and Hi is an arbitrary 
function of the others' reported willingnesses to pay. The public good 
is produced if qi+wi2'_0 in which case i enjoys utility vi from it. The 
public good is not produced if q{�wi<O. With additive, separable 
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utility,i's utility is 
{ vi + qi + Hi if qi + wi � 0 
ui 
= 
Hi if q. + w. < 0 i i 
Theorem 2. If v1(·) is continuous and gi(qi)>O (-oo<qi<oo), then 
agent i's Bayesian strategy is a reflecting point of v(·) or±""' (a 
reflecting point is a w  satisfying v(-w)""W). 
Proof. Write V.=ui-H .• Since H. is not a function of w. --- l. l. l. l. 
i's maximizing of his expected utility is the same as maximizing vi. 
Omitting the subscript i, 
E(V) = ]Joo Vh(v,q)dµ(v)dµ(q) 
_.,, _.,, 
00 -w 
J dµ (v) J (O)h(v, q)dµ (q) 
- -oo 
00 00 
+ J dµ(v) J (v+q)h(v,q)dµ(q) 
_.,, -w 
�
00
dµ(q) �(v+q)h(v,q)dµ(v) 
-w _.,, 
�g (q)dµ(q) f00 (v+q)hv[q(v[q)dµ (v) 
-w _.,, 
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�00 (V(q)+q)g (q)dµ(q) 
-w 
So, except on mass points 
dE[V(w)] = (V(-w) - w)g (-w). dw 
With g (-w) > 0, the maximum either occurs where V(-w) = w or at + �. 
The Bayesian strategy of Theorem 2 has the same interpretation 
of regret avoidance. In Figure 2, v.(q.), i's conditional expected i i 
valuation of the public good is depicted as increasing in q. (again i 
this condition is not required for the theorem) and i's Bayesian 
strategy is at w0• If i reports w0 and it turns out that qi>-w
o the 
public good is produced. After reporting w0 and learning q., i would i 
experience no regret and no wish to change his strategy, because 
v . (q.)>q . • And similarly i would not wish to change his strategy if q� 1 1 1 � 
turned out to be less than -w0 (and the public good was not produced). 
In contrast if i reported other than w0, situations could arise where i 
would wish it possible to have a different strategy. 
Note that when i believes that vi and qi are independent, Vi(qi)=Vi 
and the reflecting point of V.(•) is V . •  A special case of i i 
independence is when i believes he knows v. with certainty (so v.=V.). i i i 
In this case Theorem 2 says that i's Bayesian strategy is to report vi, 
no matter what are his beliefs as to the others' actions and information. 
In this case i's Bayesian strategy is his dominant strategy and 
Theorem 2 specializes to its old form. 
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IV. Proper Scoring Rules 
We turn now from mechanism G to the traditional class of 
incentive compatible mechanisms. This class is composed of proper 
Figure 2 scoring rules. Our purposes in doing so are to draw a link between 
Bayesian Strategy for the Groves Mechanism theories of incentive compatibility in the two areas � demand 
vi (qi) 
-w" wl 
,;o 
revelation for public goods and probability elicitation � and to 
provide a basis for comparing the new mechanism with traditional ones. 
A proper scoring rule is a special type of transfer mechanism, 
distinguished by two features. First, i's transfer is only a function 
of ri and X. Second, a proper scoring rule is defined as a rule for 
which i maximizes his expected transfer by reporting ri=Pi. Since i 
maximizes his expected transfer by ri=pi, no matter what the others 
report, Pi is not only i's Bayesian strategy but also his dominant 
strategy. 
It is well known that there is an infinite num.ber of proper 
scoring rules; nonetheless, three have received the most attention. 
These are the 
Brier , ti (ri ,X) 
{ Zri - r/ 
1 - r 2 i 
if x l 
if x 0 
Spherical, ti (r i ,X) 
and Logarithmic, t1(r1
,X) 
20 
{ I 2 2 ri/ '\Jri + (1 - r1) 
(1 - r.)/�r.2 + (1 - r.)2 i i i 
f log(r.) 
llog(l
i
- ri) 
if x = 1 
if x = 0 
if x = 1 
if x = 0 
the Brier rule has been used extensively in the evaluation of weather 
forecasters. A fourth example is particularly interesting because 
Savage (1971) based his construction of proper scoring rules on the 
idea underlying it. This rule is Marschak's seller's price mechanism, 
where 
'"" " 0 r 
if x = 1 and r. >Z i 
if r. < Z 
i 
0 otherwise 
and where Z is a random variable uniform over the unit interval. 
The idea for this definition, which appears (in different form) 
in Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964), is as follows. Assessor i is 
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given a lottery, where he wins $1 if Xml and 0 if X=O, and asked to 
reveal a price ri for which he will sell it. The principal draws a 
price Sz randomly from the unit interval. Assessor i reveals ri before 
knowing z. If r.<Z the principal buys the lottery from i, at price $Z. i 
If ri2:_Z the principal does not buy the lottery, and in that case i 
receives $1 if X=l and nothing if X=O. It is easy to check that for 
all four rules, E(t.) is maximized at r.=p . •  i i i 
At first glance it would appear that these proper scoring rules 
are quite different from mechanism G. Proper scoring rules have 
different Bayesian strategies, and for each i's transfer is decoupled 
from the others' actions. Nonetheless, there is a close link, as we 
shall see in this section. 
We begin by noting that the Brier, Spherical and Mars�hak 
rules, along with mechanism G, are normalized in the sense that 
transfers are bound between O and 1 for each. We will use the concept 
of a normalized transfer rule later, but for now we need a slightly 
different concept. 
Definition. A proper scoring rule is standardized if 
t(O,l)=t(l,O)=O and t(l,l)+t(O,O)=l. 
(A well known property of proper scoring rules is that t(r,l) 
is an increasing function of r and tCr,O) is a decreasing function, so 
a standardized rule is also normalized.) 
Neither the Brier not the Spherical rules are standardized, but 
they can be easily standardized by dividing all transfers by 2 (linear 
transformations do not affect the properness of a rule). Since in the 
Logarithmic rule ti�> -� as ri � >O when X=l, this rule is not 
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standardizable by a linear transformation. Marschak's rule, being 
probabilistic is standardized, but as we will see it is much like the 
Brier rule in expectation. 
The following theorem draws a link between mechanism G and a 
large class of proper scoring rules including the standardized versions 
of the Brier and Spherical rules. Again we omit the subscript i. 
Theorem 3. If t=t(r,X) is a standardized, differentiable 
proper scoring rule, then it has the same expected transfer as mechanism 
G for an assessor i who believes p(q)=P (all O_:::q:::l) and g(q)=t1 (q,l)-t1 (q,O) 
a where t1(q,X)= ar- t(r,X)lq· 
Proof. First we show that g(·) is well defined as a probability 
density function. For a given p and r the expected transfer of t is 
E(t[p,r) = pt(r,l) + (1 - p)t(r,O) 
and its expectation over p is 
(3) T(r) = �(pt(r,l) + (1-p)t(r,O))f (p)dµ(p) = p[t(r,l) - t(r,O)] 
0 
T'(r) = p[(t1(r,l)-t1 (r,O)] - t1(r,O)=pg(r) + t1(r,O) 
Since T is maximized by t=P for any 0 � P .:£. 1 (t is proper), we 
have t1(p,O) = -Pg(p)> to satisfy the first order condition, and since 
this is true for all 0 � P � 1, we have t1(r,O) = -rg(r). So 
T'(r) = pg(r) - rg(r) 
T"(r) = CP - r)g' (r) - g(r) 
+ t(r>O) 
For r = P to be a maximum, T" .s_ 0 at r = p, which implies g(p) ..::. 0. This 
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(and g(q) > 0 for a unique maximum). 
From definition 
(4) t(r,l) - t(r,O) 
(5) t(O,l) - t(O,O) 
r 
I g(q)dq + kl 
.o 
kl 
and since t(O,l) 0, kl = -t(O,O). 
Thus> 
t(l,l) - t(l,O) 
or t(l,l) + t(O,O) 
l 
J g(q)dq - t(O,O) 
0 
1 [ g(q)dq as t(l,O) 0 
But t(l,l) + t(O,O) = 1. So we know g(•) is well defined as a 
probability density function. 
(6) 
Because t1 (r,O) = -rg(r) 
t(r,O) 
1 
f qg(q)dq + k2 
r 
But t(l,O) 0, so k2 = O. From (3), (4),(5), and (6) 
(7) 
T(r)= p (f (q)dq - t(O,O)  + f�(q)dq 
r l l 
= p Ig(q)dq + !qg(q)dq _ p J qg(�)dq 
last condition must hold for p, so g(q) ..::_ O for O � q � 1 which is the same as (1) in Theorem 1, in the case where p(q)=p for 
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all 0 � q _:: 1 and no mass points in g(·). 
We can apply this theorem to the standardized version of the 
Brier rule. From its definition t1(r,l) � 1-p and t1(r,0) = -p, so 
g(r) 3 l - p - (-p) = 1. In other words the standardized Brier rule is 
equivalent in expectation to a special case of mechanism G where i 
believes that q1 is distributed uniformly on the unit interval and that 
qi and p are independent (so p(r) = p). 
Theorem 3 is a representation theorem. Any differentiable 
standardized proper scoring rule can be represented by a p.d.£. over 
the unit interval. Alternatively the theorem says that mechanism G can 
be used to generate proper scoring rules. The principal chooses some 
g(·), a p.d.f. over the unit interval, and announces that instead of 
defining qi to be the consensus of others, qi is to be drawn from a 
distribution with density g(·). In that case i believes (rationally) 
that p and qi are independent, and Theorem 3 applies. 
V. Bayesian Strategies Without Risk Neutrality 
In this section we use the notion of a normalized transfer rule 
to relax the assumption of risk neutrality. For normalized rules, such 
as the Brier, Spherical, Marschak, and mechanism G we can define 
corresponding lottery versions. 
Definition. Let t = (t1, • • •  ,tN) be a normalized transfer 
rule. Then the lottery version of t is defined by 
t' = (ti ·····t:N) where 
t� = 1 
{l with probability ti 
O with probability l - ti 
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Lottery versions are well defined because 0 ,::. t1 _:: 1 for normalized 
mechanisms and of course t1 + (1 - t1) = 1. In place of risk 
neutrality we assume von Neuman-Morgenstern utilities� 
Theorem 4. If i has a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function 
his Bayesian (expected utility maximizing) strategy is the fixed point 
of P1C·) under the lottery version of mechanism G and p1 under the 
lottery version of a proper scoring rule. 
�- The proof of Theorem 1 goes through as before except 
what was previously an expected transfer is now a probability of winning 
a zero-one lottery. By the axiom of monotonicity, when faced with 
dichotomous lottery i prefers higher probabilities of winning to lower 
probabilities. Similarly for proper scoring rules, the r1 =pi which 
maximizes the expected transfer of a proper scoring rule is the same 
ri = P1 which maximizes the probability of winning the lottery of the 
lottery version of the proper scoring rule. 
The idea is to avoid the assumption of risk neutrality by 
11paying off in probability." In one form or another the idea can be 
traced back to Savage [1954], Smith [1961], and Marschak [1975]. 
Grether's mechanism is a lottery version of Marschak's rule, and is 
thus an application of the idea. McKelvey and Ordeshook [19841 also 
"paid in probabilities11 in ar. experimental setting. 
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VI. Information Pooling 
In this and the next two sections we consider three possible 
goals the principal might have: information pooling, sharp research 
incentives relative to the principal's budget, and identification of 
the best assessor. 
After the principal receives the reported probabilities he 
must somehow aggregate them to a consensus estimate of the probability 
of X. An ideal situation would be if the principal's aggregation of 
the Cr1, • • •  ,rn) produced the pooled information expectation 
E(ply1, . • •  ,yn). However, since the principal doesn't know the underlying 
information structure, he doesn't know what aggregation rule, if any, 
would produce the pooled information expectation. Being in the dark, the 
principal may choose a simple aggregation rule; the rule must often 
be discussed or recommended by theorists appears to be an average of the 
reported probabilities. (Savage [1971], DeGroot [1974]). 
A way out of this quandry is for the principal to have the 
assessors do the information aggregation themselves. Geanakoplos and 
Polemarchakis [1982] have shown that for two assessors who start with 
common knowledge of the general (but finite) structure of information 
and individual private knowledge as well, and who then successively report 
their posterior probabilities to each other, their posterior probabilities 
eventually become the same. The final consensus is not necessarily the 
same as the pooled information expectation of p, and the iterative process 
can take many rounds to terminate, but under favorable conditions the 
process terminates in the pooled information expectation in the second 
round. The simplest of the favorable conditions is that each i's posterior 
probability be a 1-1 function from his informaion set. McKelvey and Page 
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[1983] have generalized this result to n assessors and for successive 
revelations of £unctions of the reports (instead of revelations of all 
n reports individually for each round). 
These results mean that the principal could use a proper scoring 
rule to elicit (p1, . . •  ,j)n)' make these reports known, elicit new 
(j?1, • • .  ,pn) (conditional on the new information), and so on until all 
the P1 are equal. At this point the principal would not know for sure 
that he had obtained the pooled information expectation, but if the 
posteriors were 1-1 functions he would obtain the pooled information 
expectation in the second round. Alternatively the principal could use 
mechanism G to elicit the Bayesian strategies (r1, • • •  ,rn)' make them 
known and elicit a new round of reported probabilities, and so on 
until all the reports are the same. And similarly if the s1(·) are 
invertible, the principal would obtain the pooled information expectation 
at the second round. A difference between the two types of mechanisms 
is that under a proper scoring rule, the principal could elicit 
CP1, • • •  ,pn) in the first round and then could elicit just one probability 
in the second round, saving on his budget, whereas under mechanism G 
at least two reports have to be elicited in the second round to make 
the mechanism work. 
It is interesting to note how close the two types of mechanisms 
come to the pooled information expectation in the first round. For 
Information Structure p and the case n = 2, M1 = M2 = M , and symmetric 
and invertible strategy functions, recall that 
P; = (1 + Y;)/(2 + M) 
Si (yi) = (1 + 2yi)/(2 + 2M) 
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(Bayesian strategy for 
mechanism G) 
and note that the pooled information expectation is 
(1 + y1 + y2)/(2 + 2M). 
Thus if the principal used mechanism G and took the average of the 
reports he would obtain the pooled information expectation in the first 
round. If he used a proper scoring rule he would not. 
For Information Structure X and the case n=2, M1=M2=M, and 
symmetric and invertible strategy functions, recall that 
P; • 1/(1 +DA
M - 2yi] 
S(yi) " 1/(1 + DA
2M-4yi) 
and note that the pooled information expectation is 
1/(1 + DA2M - 2yl - 2y2] 
Thus a simple average of the reports under either proper scoring 
rules or mechanism G will not yield the pooled information expectation. 
(In mechanism G, when y1 = Yz the pooled information expectation is 
obtained, and more generally for mechanism G, with n=2, if the principal 
took the geometric mean of the reported probabilities he would obtain 
the pooled information expectation.) 
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For these two cases, mechanism G does a little better than proper 
scoring rules in the first round. But in more complicated cases it is 
difficult to compute Bayesian strategies for mechanism G and there 
can be multiple equilibria, in which case information might be lost 
in an averaging process. 
VII. Research Incentives 
A possible goal for the principal is to find a transfer rule 
which maximizes research incentives for the assessors. The search must be 
over a constrained set; otherwise the principal could increase research 
incentives without limit by simply scaling up a transfer rule. We 
begin by looking for the standardized proper scoring rule which maximizes 
the value of information to i, when his current expectation of p is pi. 
Any transfer t from one of these rules is constrained by 0 _::. t _:: 1. 
By (7) in Theorem 3 i's expected transfer for his Bayesian 
strategy ri = Pi is (omitting i) 
p 1 l 
T\p) • p [g(q)dq + 1 qg(q)dq - p [ qg(q)dq 
p 
The assessor can simply reveal i's current p, or undertake research to 
update -p-. Suppose, if he undertakes research, the research is positive, 
and the expectation of p is pb > p. And suppose, if the new research is 
negative, his new expectation of p is pa < p. Write the probability of 
a positive research finding as a. (Then of course apb + (1 - a)pa = p). 
Then the expected value of information is 
(8) VOI oT(pb) + (1 - o)T(pa) - T\p) . 
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By Theorem 3 we can associate each standardized proper scoring rule 
with a p. d. f. , and vice versa. Thus the principal's problem is to 
find the p.d.f. which maximizes the VOI in (8). Theorem 4 provides the 
condition for this. 
Theorem 4. If i's expectation of p is currently p, the standardized 
proper scoring rule which maximizes the agent's expected value of 
information from further research is characterized by an associated p.d.f. 
which is fully concentrated at p. 
rule, 
Proof. Applying (!) to (8), for a standardized proper scoring 
Pb 1 1 
VOI " o�b f g (q)dq + f qg(q)dq - pbf qg(q)dq) 
0 Pb 0 
(1 - o)(pa/�(q)dq + f�g(q)dq - Paf�g(q)dq) 
p 
0 1 Pa ( 0 
- 1>f g(q)dq + f qg(q)dq - p J qg(q)d (q) 
0 p 0 
Pb Pa p 
(1 - o)pa f g(q)dq - pf g(q)dq opb f g(q)dq + 
0 0 0 
1 
+ ·f 
Pb 
1 
qg(q)dq + (1 - o) f qg(q)dq -
Pa 
1 
f qg(q)dq 
p 
p p Pb 
opb J g(q)dq + opbf g(q)dq + (1 -
0 p 
o)pa f g(q)dq 
0 
(9) 
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- (1 - o)pa f g(q)dq - p Jpg(q)dq 
Pa 0 
1 
+ "f qg(q)dq 
p 
- .f\ g(q)dq + 
p 
(1 -
p 
+ (1 - o) f qg(q)dq -
pa 
1 
f qg(q)dq 
p 
1 
•)f qg(q)dq 
p 
Pb !-•f (pb - q) g(q)dq - (1 - o) (q - P) g(q)dq Pa p 
We are looking for a function g (q) which maximizes (9) subject to 
1 
J � (q)dq = 1 and g (q) � O. This is a simple isoperimetric control 
0 
problem and its solution is a g(·) fully concentrated at p. 
We can interpret Theorem 4 by returning to (7) from Theorem 3. 
Note that T is a function of r and p. Write T = T(r,p) and consider 
J(J)) = T(p,p), i's expected transfer when he reports his Bayesian 
strategy r "" P for a proper scoring rule. From (7) J"(p) ::::: g(p). 
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Since g is a p.d.f. with g(•) � 0, i's expected transfer under Bayesian 
reporting J(·) is a convex function, and more convex where g(·) is 
more concentrated. Where J is more convex, there is a greater VOI from 
research which revises p. 
Theorem. 4 is not of direct help to the principal, because he 
is in the dark as to the current p1 and thus cannot define individual 
scoring rules Yi.th p.d.f.'s concentrated in the J? .. 
i 
An attractive feature of mechanism G is that it may allow the 
principal to achieve some of the benefits of Theorem 4, in stronger 
research incentives, without the principal himself knowing the current 
P's of the agents. If i believes that the consensus of others is likely 
to be close ot his ovm. current pi -- a plausible assumption 
feel some of the incentives described in Theorem 4. 
From (2) 
T"(r) = <P' (r)-l)g(r) + (p(r) - r)g' (r) 
he will 
Thus i's expected transfer function at the point r = PCr) (his Bayesian 
report) has convexity CP' (r) - l)g(r). The more concentrated g(r) at 
the point of i's current Bayesian report, the greater the convexity and 
greater i's incentive to undertake research which might revise his 
expectation of p. Conversely the more sensitive i's conditional 
expectation Pi(qi) to qi (the closer Pi(·) to the diagonal in Figure 1, 
the smaller the convexity and the smaller i's research incentives. 
We can see how these two factors trade off in specific cases. 
In each case in Table 1 assessor l's information is specified by M1 = 5. 
Assessor 2's information is better, with M2=10 or M2=
15. For information 
Structure X, the case is taken for D=.5 and A:l.5. The difference in 
expected transfers, as a percent of assessor l's expected transfer is 
shown in Table 1. (Comparing the expected transfers in relative terms 
normalizes differences in expected transfers among the various rules.) 
Table l 
Relative Value of Information: 
The Difference between Assessor 2's Expected Transfer 
and Assessor l's Expected Transfer as a Percent of 
Assessor l's Expected Transfer. 
Information 
Structure p 
Information 
Structure X 
Ml 5 
{ 
{ 
M� 
10 
15 
10 
15 
G Sphere 
12.4 5.2 
18.7 7.3 
28.9 5.1 
57.1 9.1 
I 
Brier Log !Marschak 
1.2 .8 .8 
1. 7 1.1 1.1 
4.1 2.3 2.5 
7.3 4.3 4.5 
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As can be seen, Mechanism G perfonns better than the others in providing 
a higher relative value of information to the assessor with the better 
information.1 
The Marschak and Brier rules can be compared as follows. For 
a given p i's expected transfer for the Marschak rule is 
r [ (p) (l)dq 1 + J (q)(l)dq =pr + 1/2 - r2/2 
r 
and, taking the expectation over p, his expected transfer is 
1 
� = [ prf(p)dp + 1/2 - r2/2 = rp + 1/2 - r2/2 
and for the Bayesian strategy r = p, his expected transfer is 
JM\p) = p2 /2 - 1/2. 
JM = i 
In comparison the i's expected transfer for the standardized 
Brier rule is 
TB = p(2r - r
2)/2 + (1 - Pl (1 - p2)/2 = pr + 1/2 - r2/2 - p/2 
and for this rule JB also is 1. Note TM - p/2 = TB. These two 
conditions mean that the VOI, relative to i's expected transfer is 
everywhere higher for the Brier rule, compared with Marschak's. 
(If i truly believes p = O, he bas no need of further research.) Grether's 
rule is the lottery version of Marschak's rule, so the same comparison can 
be made between Grether's rule and the Brier rule. 
Table 2 
Probability of Identifying Assessor 2 After Forty Trials 
Information 
Structure p 
Information 
Structure X 
M1 = 5 
M\ 
[ ,: 15 
[·: 15 
G Sphere 
.4Z.6 .456 
.554 .548 
.602 .584 
.449 .448 
.700 .614 
.841 .737 
Brier Log Marschak 
.443 .416 .453 
.484 .466 .472 
.507 .482 .479 
.445 .438 .453 
.593 .538 .513 
.704 .621 .563 
I 
: 
' 
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VIII. Identification 
Suppose that a principal has two assessors as consultants and 
wishes, after a lilnited number of assessments, to hire permanently the 
one who has consistently better information (Roberts (1965] has an early 
discussion of this identification problem.). The principal chooses a 
transfer rule and after R rounds hires the assessor with the higher 
sum of transfers over the R rounds. The principal wants to choose a 
transfer rule under which the assessor who has the best information has 
a high probability of having the higher sum of transfers. These 
probabilities are easily computed if the principal uses lottery versions 
of the transfer rules. In the lottery version i's probability of winning 
a zero-one lottery is his expected transfer E(ti) under the original 
definition of the transfer rule. With the same information structure 
for R rounds the sum of Yins for i is a binomial random variable with 
parameters R and E(ti). For the two information structures, the 
probability that assessor 2 will have the higher sum of transfers after 
40 rounds2is shown in Table 2. It can be seen that Mechanism G performs 
better than the proper scoring rules in identifying the best assessor 
after a limited number of rounds. (Note that in several cases the 
probability of assessor 2 being ahead after 40 rounds is less than .5; 
this is because of ties. The frequency of ties can be seen by the first 
and fourth rows in Table 2.) 
While mechanism G performs well compared with the four proper 
scoring rules in tenns of information pooling, research incentives 
and identifiability, it should be noted that the Bayesian equilibrium 
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is hard to caluclate when there are more than two assessors and there 
can be multiple Bayesian equilibria, which can lead to difficulties. 
In contrast, the Bayesian equilibria are easy to calculate for proper 
scoring rules and they are unique. 
IX. Conclusion 
This paper is a bridge between two areas of research: theories 
of incentive compatibility in the reporting of willingness to pay for a 
public good and theories of incentive compatibility in the reporting 
of subjective probabilities. A new mechanism for reporting subjective 
probabilities is discovered by analogy with the Groves mechanism for 
public goods, and the Bayesian (also dominant) strategy for it characterized 
in Theorem 1. The idea of the theorem is then carried back to the 
public goods model and the basic theorem of the Groves mechanism is 
generalized in Theorem 2 for the situation where true valuations are 
uncertain because they depend upon future states of nature. Theorem 3 
shows how the new mechanism is a generalization of the traditional 
elicitation mechanisms for probability reporting. Theorem 4 obtains 
the condition for maximizing research incentives for standardized 
proper scoring rules and relates this condition to the new mechanism. 
For the cases considered the new mechanism appears to perform 
about as well as proper scoring rules in pooling information in two or 
more reporting rounds. In the first round the new mechanism comes 
closer to pooled information expectation than do proper scoring rules 
(for the few cases considered). And, for the numerical cases considered 
the new mechanism performs better than proper scoring rules in 
allocating a relatively larger expected transfer to the assessor 
with the best information and in identifying the assessor with the best 
information over a limited number of rounds. 
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1To bound the range of the Logarithmic rule, the rule was truncated 
by setting ri=.02 for ri<.02. The truncated rule is not proper for 
ri<.02 butthere is little effect of the truncation in Table 1 since 
ri<.02 arises infrequently for Information Structure X and not at all 
for Information Structure p. The truncation makes it possible to 
define a lottery version of the Logarithmic rule and the construction 
of Table 2. 
2'When M1+M2 we modified the assumption about symmetric strategy functions. 
We assumed that the strategies are "symmetrically asymmetric," in the 
-1 -1 sense that M1s2 ( · ) = M2s1 ( · ) . This reduces to the symmetric case 
-1 -1 when M1=M2 and provides for s1 ( · ) and s2 ( · ) having full ranges 
compared with the expectations on the full information y1 + y2• This 
assumption yields Bayesian strategies of r1 = (l+(l+M1/M2)y1)/(2,:tM1+M2) 
and r2 = (l+(l+M2/M1)y2)/(2+M1+M2) under Information Structure p and 
r1 = l/[l+A
Ml+M2-2Y1(l+Hi/Ml)] and r2 = l/[l+A
M1+M2-2Yz(l+Ml/Mz)] 
under Information Structure X. 
As in Table 1, the Logarithmic rule is truncated by setting 
r1=.02 for r1<.02. 
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